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A REVIEW OF NAFTA INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CLAIMS
FROM 2007 To 2017
Phuong Tran*
I. INTRODUCTIONS INCE the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was
successfully negotiated in 1993,1 the provisions for investor-state
dispute settlement (ISDS) under Chapter 11 have been considered
to be a threat to the legal sovereignty of its member countries. 2 Under
Chapter 11, any investor alleging a breach by a host country can file an
arbitration claim.3 Critics of Chapter 11 are primarily concerned with the
use of corporations' power to overturn or significantly weaken NAFTA
countries' ability to legislate or regulate in the public interest.4 Further, if
a corporation wins its ISDS claims, taxpayers of the losing country must
foot the bill.5 It is likely that there will be many changes to NAFTA,
especially to this controversial chapter, as promised by President Trump.6
This paper will revisit the ISDS claims under Chapter 11 raised during the
past ten years to now. Specifically, this paper will review the various is-
sues raised under Chapter 11's most contested provisions.
The first part of this article briefly introduces NAFITA Chapter 11 and
the ISDS mechanism. The second part of this article discusses the ISDS
claims involving environmental regulations by NAFTA countries. This
article concludes that it is time to review NAFTA Chapter 11 to reduce
the uncertainty and unpredictability of ISDS arbitral awards and to lessen
public concerns.
*Phuong Tran is a third-year at SMU Dedman School of Law. She is serving as the
NAFTA Reporter for the International Law Review Association. She would like
to thank her fianc6 and family for their love and support.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. See William Owen, Investment Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Threat to
Sovereignty of Member States?, 39 CASE W. REs. CAN.-U.S. L. J. 55 (2015), 3.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. NAFTA Chapter 11: Corporate Cases, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/
Page.aspx?pid=1218 (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
6. Kristen Walker, Trump to Sign Executive Order on Plan to Renegotiate NAFTA
with Mexico, Canada, NBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/23/
trump-to-sign-executive-order-to-renegotiate-nafta-and-intent-to-leave-tpp.html.
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11
The original purpose of including an ISDS mechanism in NAFTA was
to create "a predictable environment for investment" across North
America.7 Chapter 11 was specifically created for Canadian and U.S. in-
vestors to ensure their investments in Mexico would not be taken without
due process.8 This concern stemmed from the weakness of the Mexico's
judiciary independence from the government.9 In order to attract foreign
investments from the United States and Canada, Mexico determined it
was in its national interest to accept ISDS provisions.10
Generally, tribunal decisions do not establish precedent under interna-
tional law.' Previous decisions cannot explicitly be used to influence fu-
ture decisions. 1 2  If investors succeed in challenging the laws or
regulations of a NAFTA member, ISDS tribunals cannot force member
countries to reverse or dismantle the laws or regulations in questions.13
Tribunals can only impose a financial award for monetary damages, mate-
rial interest, litigation costs, or restitution of property.1 4 A tribunal may
not order a party to pay punitive damages.' 5
Chapter 11 includes twenty articles, i.e. articles 1101 to 1120.16 Many
NAFTA disputes are based on article 1102 (National Treatment),1 7 article
1103 (Most Favored Nation Treatment),' 8 article 1105 (Minimum Stan-
dard of Treatment),1 9 and article 1110 (Expropriation and
Compensation).20
Article 1102 contains the National Treatment doctrine. 2 1 This doctrine
is common to many trading blocs agreements. 22 The National Treatment
doctrine requires a member country to give investors from another mem-
ber country treatment no less favorable than that it provides to its own
investors in similar situations. 2 3 For example, if a tribunal decides that
Canada gives preferential treatment to Canadian companies' projects
7. NAFTA, supra note 1.
8. KYLA TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:
PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTORS AT TIE EXPENSE OF Puu3LIc POLICY 40 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2009).
9. Howard Mann, Private Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to NAFTA's Controver-
sial Chapter on Investor Rights (2001), INT'LNST. SUSTAINABLE DEv., http://www
.iisd.org/pdf/tradecitizensguide.pdf (last visited Mar. 26 2017).
10. Owen, supra note 2, at 3.
11. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136.
12. Id.
13. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1135.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. NAFTA, supra note 1, chapter 11.
17. Id. art. 1102.
18. Id. art. 1103.
19. Id. art. 1105.
20. Id. art. 1110.
21. Id. art. 1102.
22. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. III, Sep. 30, 2011, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
23. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1102.
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that are similar to projects of investors who are from other NAFTA coun-
tries, that tribunal may find the Canadian government liable for breach of
article 1102.24
Article 1103 includes the Most Favored Nation Treatment doctrine.2 5
This doctrine expands the National Treatment doctrine to ensure that in-
vestments of a member country's investors receive the same treatment as
similar investments from a third-member country.2 6 For example, if a Ca-
nadian company and a Mexican company have similar projects in the
United States, the U.S. government must treat them equally.27 If one
company is treated better than the other, the U.S. government can be
found liable under this article.28 The Most Favored Nation Treatment is
doctrine is also found in many trading blocs agreements. 29
The doctrine of Minimum Standard of Treatment in accordance with
International Law is embedded in NAFTA through article 1105.30 This
doctrine ties the expected minimum standard of treatment between Par-
ties to the customary international law standard of fair and equitable
treatment.3 1 Different tribunals have interpreted this doctrine differ-
ently. Some decided to interpret it broadly. 32 Some decided to interpiet
it narrowly.3 3 Because different tribunals can interpret this doctrine dif-
ferently, an ISDS award can be unpredictable to both claimants and
NAFTA governments. 34
Article 1110 prevents NAFTA countries from nationalizing or expro-
priating an investment of a NAFTA investor.35 A NAFTA country may
only nationalize or expropriate such investment when there is a public
purpose, the procedures are conducted on a non-discriminatory basis and
in accordance with due process of law and article 1105(1), and the gov-
ernment must compensate such NAFTA investor in accordance with arti-
cle 1110(2).36 The key issue of this article is what "tantamount to
expropriation" means. If "tantamount to expropriation" is defined too
broadly, it may be difficult for governments to regulate without being
sued by companies who believe their opportunities to make a profit have
24. Id. art. 1102.




29. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 22, at art. I.
30. Id. art. 1105.
31. Id.
32. See e.g., Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't Canada (2008), PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability 1 724 (Mar. 17, 2015).
33. See Courtney Kirkman, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Methanex v. U.S. and the
Narrowing Scope of NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 343, 366
(2002).
34. See Stephen Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA Legiti-
macy Crisis, 8 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 103 (2007).
35. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110.
36. Id. art. 1110(2).
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been expropriated. 37 But, if defined too narrowly, the government will
have greater leeway to regulate, possibly creating a disincentive for for-
eign investment.38 Similar to article 1105, this article also raises the con-
cern of the unpredictability of the ISDS mechanism to both claimants and
NAFTA governments. 39
Several cases from 2007 to 2017 have raised the question of whether, or
in what circumstances, governments may be required to pay compensa-
tion to foreign investors because environmental protection measures vio-
late a Chapter 11 article. These cases have also raised the legal issues of
Chapter 11 regarding investor protections and the constraints on NAFTA
governments' ability to protect the environment. The following section of
this article focuses on those cases.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL RELATED CASES FROM 2007 TO 2017
From 2007 to 2017, ISDS tribunals received several notable claims in-
volving NAFTA governments' environmental regulations. These claims
include Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada (2008),40 Dow AgroS-
ciences LLC v. Government of Canada (2008),41 CANACAR v. United
States of America (2008),42 Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of
Canada (2009),43 Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada
(2012),44 and TransCanada Corporation and TransCanada Pipelines Ltd.
v. the United States. 4 5
A. CLAYTON/BILCON v. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
The Clayton family and their corporation, Bilcon of Delaware Inc., are
U.S. investors who own and control shares in a Canadian subsidiary
named Bilcon of Nova Scotia. 46 On February 5, 2008, Clayton/Bilcon
challenged Canadian environmental requirements affecting their plans to
open a basalt quarry and a marine terminal in Nova Scotia.47 The Clay-
37. Bronwyn Pavey & Tim Williams, NAFTA: Chapter 11, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Div., PRB 02-54E (Feb., 26, 2003), available at http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/Content/
LOP/ResearchPublicationsArchive/inbriefl000/prb0254-e.asp.
38. Id.
39. See Byrnes, supra note 34.
40. Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't Canada (2008), PCA Case No. 2009-04, available at http://
www.italaw.com/cases/1588.
41. Dow AgroSciences v. Gov't Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, available at http://www
.uncitral.org/transparency-registry/registry/data/can/dow-agrosciencesllc.html.
42. CANACAR v. U.S., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration (Apr. 2, 2009), 1 2-4, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italawll42.pdf.
43. Windstream Energy LLC v. Gov't Can., PCA Case No. 2013-22, available at http://
www.italaw.com/cases/1585.
44. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Gov't Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, available
at http://www.italaw.com/cases/1606.
45. TransCanada Corp. & TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. v. U.S, ICSID Case No. ARB/
16/21, available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/3823#sthash.B92P2UT3.dpuf.
46. Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't Canada (2008), PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Juris-
diction and Liability 1¶ 1, 2 (Mar. 17, 2015).
47. Id. ¶¶ 12-14.
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ton/Bilcon brought a $443,350,772 lawsuit under articles 1102 (National
Treatment), 1103 (Most Favored Nation Treatment), and 1105 (Minimum
Standard of Treatment) to a UNCITRAL tribunal.48 The family origi-
nally planned to extract and to ship out large quantities of basalt from the
proposed 152-hectare project, which was located in a key breeding area
for several endangered species.49 Because blasting activity in this sensi-
tive area might affect the environment, the governments of Canada and
Nova Scotia decided to jointly assess the environmental effects of the Bil-
con's project.5 0 After three years, the governments both determined that
the project might cause significant adverse environmental effects and sub-
sequently denied the project.5 ' Clayton/Bilcon argued that the assess-
ment and subsequent denial was arbitrary, discriminatory, and unfair;
thus caused a violation of articles 1102, 1103, and 1105.52
In March 2015, the tribunal majority found for Clayton/Bilcon under
articles 1102 and 1105(1).53 The majority found that Canada liable for
violating article 1102 because this provision required Canada to provide
NAFTA investors treatment no less favorable than the treatment it pro-
vided to domestic investors. 54 The assessment standards applied against
the Clayton/Bilcon had never been applied in other environmental assess-
ments.5 5 The tribunal also found that Canadian government also failed to
show any legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for such difference in
treatment. 56 The majority of the tribunal also found Canada liable for
violating article 1105(1).57 The tribunal adopted a broad interpretation of
the Minimum Standard of Treatment Obligation under a former ISDS
tribunal's decision in Waste Management.58 According to the majority, ar-
ticle 1105(1) requires that investors of NAFTA members be treated "in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security."5 9 The Canadian government's denial
relied on the application of a standard, "core community values," not
48. Id. ¶ 11.
49. See Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't Ca-
nada, GLOB. AFFAIRS CAN. (last updated Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.interna-
tional.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/
clayton.aspx?lang=eng.
50. Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't Can. (2008), PCA Case No. 2009-04, Gov't Can. Rejoin-
der, ¶ 13 (Mar. 21, 2013), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italawl489.pdf.
51. Id. ¶ 13.
52. Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't Canada (2008), PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Juris-
diction and Liability 1 11 (Mar. 17, 2015), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw4212.pdf [hereinafter
53. Id. ¶ 742.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. T¶ 723-31.
57. Id.
58. Id. 1 572; see also Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (Apr. 30, 2004), T 98-99, available at http://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita900.pdf.
59. Id. ¶ 572.
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found in Canadian law. 6 0
The minority of the tribunal dissented to the majority's broad interpre-
tation of article 1105.61 The dissent criticizes the majority's decision as
fundamentally departing from the standard of assessment required by the
Canadian law and failed to properly assess customary international law.6 2
The minority also warned that the decision would cause a chilling effect
on Canadian government's ability to regulate environment.63
The arbitration is now in damages phase.64 Parties are currently sub-
mitting evidence concerning the amount of damages and compensation
awards.6 5
B. Dow AGROSCIENCES LLC v. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
Dow AgroSciences LLC, a corporation incorporated in Delaware, is
wholly owned by the U.S. Dow Chemical Company.66 On August 25,
2008, the claimant filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim for $1.5 million in
damages. 67 The damages were allegedly caused by a Quebec provincial
ban on the sale and particular uses of lawn pesticides containing the ac-
tive ingredient 2.4-D. 68 Dow AgroSciences alleged that the ban violated
articles 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment) and 1110 (Expropria-
tion).6 9 Quebec and other provinces explained that they banned the in-
gredient as an environmental precaution.70 They also based their
decisions in response to public support for the pesticide ban.71 When
Dow AgroSciences filed the NAFTA claim, other provinces were still
considering the ban.72
Three years later, after five provinces followed Quebec's lead and
banned the pesticides, Dow AgroSciences decided to settle with Canada
60. Id.
61. See Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't Canada (2008), PCA Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting
Opinion of Professor Donald McRae, T 1 (Mar. 10, 2015), available at http://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4213.pdf.
62. Id. T 14.
63. Id. T$ 48, 51.
64. Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't Canada (2008), PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Juris-
diction and Liability T 742 (Mar. 17, 2015).
65. Id.
66. Dow AgroSciences v. Gov't Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent to Sub-
mit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Aug. 25, 2008), available
at http://www.uncitral.org/res/transparency-registry/registry/data/can/dow-agrosci
ences11 chtml/dow-01.pdf [hereinafter DowAgroSciences, Notice of Intent].
67. See Cases Filed Against the Gov't Can., Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Gov't Can.,
GLOB. AlFAIRS CAN. (last updated Dec. 31, 2015), available at http://www.interna-
tional.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/
agrosciences.aspx?lang=eng [hereinafter Cases File Against Gov't Can., Dow
AgroSciences].
68. Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Intent, ¶T 14-15.
69. Id.
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in a deal that left the ban intact. 73 Dow AgroSciences did not demand
monetary compensation.74 Instead, Dow AgroSciences required Quebec
to state, "Products containing 2,4-D do not pose an unacceptable risk to
human health or the environment provided that the instructions on the
label are followed."75 Dow AgroSciences used the statement as a govern-
mental acknowledgement that the contested pesticides were safe. 76
C. CANACAR V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CANACAR, a trade association representing individual carriers of the
Mexican trucking industry, alleged that the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation refused entry of CANACAR into the United States for trucking
services and prohibited CANACAR from making investments in the
United States to provide such services.77 CANACAR brought the claim
under articles 1102 (National Treatment) and 1103 (Most Favored Nation
Treatment).78 CANARA also alleged that the United States had failed to
comply with a 2001 NAFTA Chapter 20 arbitral decision (In the Matter of
Cross-Border Trucking Services).79 Thus, CANACAR alleged that the
United States violated article 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment
under International Law).80 The U.S. government, under the Clinton ad-
ministration explained that studies by the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation revealed severe safety and environmental problems with the
Mexico's truck fleet and drivers' licensing.81 Thus, the United States re-
sisted implementing prior obligations promised under the Bush adminis-
tration.82 This resistance caused CANARA initiated the claim in 2008,
seeking $6 billion in damages.83
In 2014, using the ISDS mechanism as a political pressure the United
States to grant such access, CANACAR announced that it would seek $30
billion and loss of opportunities. 84 Nearly ten years later, CANACAR
73. Dow AgroSciences, Settlement Agreement (May 25, 2011).
74. Id.
75. Id. ¶ 3.
76. Cases File Against Gov't Can., Dow AgroSciences, supra note 68.
77. CANACAR v. U.S., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration (Apr. 2, 2009), t¶ 2-4, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italawll42.pdf.
78. Id. ¶ 4.
79. Id.; see also In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No.
USA-MEX-98-2008-01 (Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/
nafta/english/U98081ae.asp.
80. CANACAR v. U.S., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration (Apr. 2, 2009), 1 4, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italawl142.pdf.
81. See Background on NAFTA Cross-border Trucking Case, PuB. CITIZEN, available
at http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=5251 (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
82. Id.
83. Mexican Trucking Group Suing U.S. for $6 Billion, TRANSP. Topics (Jan. 6, 2009),
http://www.ttnews.com/articles/basetemplate.aspx?storyid=22039.
84. CANA CAR says "Ya Basta!" Starts arbitration against United States for failure to
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first filed the claim to UNCITRAL, the claim is still pending.85
D. WINDSTREAM ENERGY LLC v. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
Windstream Energy LLC (Windstream) is a U.S. company.8 6 In No-
vember 2009, through its Canadian subsidiary, Windstream Wolfe Island
Shoals (WWIS), Windstream submitted eleven applications to the Onta-
rio Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) Program for wind power projects.8 7 The Ontario
Power Authority (OPA), an independent non-profit organization, offered
Windstream a FIT contract in May 2010, after determining that Wind-
stream applications had met the basic conditions of a FIT application.88
Windstream did not sign the contract immediately.89
Instead, Windstream requested extensions while the Government of
Ontario undertook a policy review on offshore wind development.90 The
Ontario Ministry of the Environment's Offshore Wind Policy Notice de-
termined that work on the regulatory framework for offshore wind
projects remained incomplete. 9 ' Thus, the Ministry cooperated with
other ministries to develop the environmental rules and requirements, in-
cluding a proposal of a five-kilometer shoreline exclusion zone for off-
shore wind projects. 92
In 2010, before the Ministry finalized the policy review on offshore
wind, Windstream decided to sign the FIT contract.93 The contract re-
quired Windstream to acquire all of the necessary permits and approvals
to develop the project.94 In February 2011, the Government of Ontario
decided to defer offshore wind development until the necessary scientific
research was completed and an adequately informed policy framework
could be developed. 95
Windstream claims that the Government of Ontario's decision wrong-
fully denied its opportunity to obtain the benefits of the 2010 contract it
signed with the OPA.96 Windstream asked for $354.91 million in dam-
ages.9 7 Windstream alleges that the Government of Ontario acted in an
expropriatory, arbitrary, and discriminatory manner when it deferred off-
85. Windstream Energy LLC v. Gov't Can., PCA Case No. 2013-22, Notice of Intent
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under NAFIA Chapter 11 (Oct. 17, 2012), $ 3,
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawll41
.pdf [hereinafter Windstream Energy LLC, Notice of Intent].
86. See id. 19 4-8.
87. Id. J 8.
88. Id. ¶ 14.
89. Id. % 24.
90. Windstream Energy LLC v. Gov't Can., PCA Case No. 2013-22, Can. Response to
the Notice of Arbitration (Apr. 26, 2013), T 25, available at http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl612.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Id. T 26.
93. Id. T 5.
94. Id.
95. Id. ¶ 40.
96. Windstream Energy LLC, Notice of Intent ¶ 7.
97. Id. ¶ 44.
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shore wind development, resulting in the loss of Windstream's invest-
ment. 98 Windstream alleges that the decision was made in an arbitrary
and political manner.99 Windstream brought the claim under articles
1102, 1103, 1105, and 1110.100
The tribunal decided that the Government of Canada failed to accord
the claimant's investments fair and equitable treatment in accordance
with international law, contrary to article 1105 of NAFTA.101 The tribu-
nal dismissed the rest of the claimant's claim under articles 1102, 1103,
and 1110.102 The tribunal awarded $2.175 million to the Windstream. 0 3
The arbitration process alone was costly. While the Windstream were
awarded over two millions dollars, both parties had made advances to
pay for the fixed costs of arbitration in the amount of $485,355, which is
almost one-fourth of the actual arbitral award. 104
E. LONE PINE RESOURCES INC. V. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
Lone Pine Resources Inc. (LPRI) is a company incorporated in the
State of Delaware.105 LPRI owns Lone Pine Resources Canada Ltd.
(LPRC).1.06 LPRC is an oil and gas resources development and produc-
tion company incorporated in Alberta. 10 7 It operates in Alberta, British
Columbia, Quebec, and the Northwest Territories. 108 In 2006, LPRI
signed an agreement with a Canadian company named Junex Inc., in
which LPRI secured five exploration licenses for petroleum, natural gas
and underground reservoirs located near Trois-Rivibres, a city in Que-
bec. 109 Four of the exploration licenses are located on land and one is
located in the St. Lawrence River.110 The exploration license located in
the St. Lawrence River was revoked in 2011 because of a new Quebec
act-An Act to Limit Oil and Gas Activities.' 1 ' The Act revokes explora-
tion licenses located in the St. Lawrence River and limits the area of
those that cross the water's edge to their land portion.112
98. Id. ¶ 43.
99. Id. ¶ 7.
100. Id.
101. Windstream Energy LLC v. Gov't Can., PCA Case No. 2013-22, Arbitral Award
(Sep. 27, 2016), $ 25, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-doc-
uments/italaw7875.pdf.
102. Id. ¶ 515.
103. Id.
104. Id. ¶ 509.
105. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Gov't Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, available
at http://www.italaw.com/cases/1606.
106. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Gov't Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Notice of
Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Nov. 8,
2012), ¶ 7, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw1156.pdf.
107. Id. ¶ 8.
108. Id.
109. Id. ¶ 17-19.
110. Id. ¶ 3.
111. Id.
112. Id. ¶ 49.
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In 2012, through LPRC, LPRI brought a $118.9 million lawsuit under
articles 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment) and 1110 (Expropria-
tion). 1 3 LPRI alleges that the revocation of the river license violates Ca-
nada's obligations under articles 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment)
and 1110 (Expropriation).11 4 Specifically, LPRI alleges that the passing
of the Act is an arbitrary, unfair, and inequitable measure based on politi-
cal rather than actual environmental grounds."15 It also alleges that this
measure violates the legitimate expectations that it had when it decided
to invest in Quebec. 116 And, finally, LPRI alleges that the revocation of
the river license expropriated its investment without any compensation.
In response to LPRI's allegations under article 1105, the Canadian gov-
ernment explained that the Act was passed after numerous studies on
hydrocarbon development in the maritime estuary basin and the north-
western Gulf of St. Lawrence.' 17 The studies concluded that this environ-
ment was not suitable for hydrocarbon development activities."18 Other
studies also showed the existence of risks to the biophysical and human
environment tied to shale gas development activities involving hydraulic
fracturing."1 9 Further, the government also claimed that the Act applied
indiscriminately to all holders of exploration licenses that were located
fully or partially in the St. Lawrence River.120
In response to LPRI's claim under article 1110, the Government of Ca-
nada explained that the Act was not a measure that affects the claimant
because it is not the holder of the exploration license owned by Junex.121
Instead, the measure was enacted by a fundamental democratic institu-
tion of Quebec and was preceded by numerous scientific studies.1 22 The
purpose of the Act is to achieve an important public policy objective-the
protection of the St. Lawrence River.123 Further, the Act did not sub-
stantially deprive LPRI of its investment because the Act revoked only
one of the five exploration licenses that LPRI obtained through the 2006
agreement with Junex.1 24
Currently, the ISDS tribunal is reviewing both LPRI's allegation and
the responses by the Canadian Government. 1 2 5 The claim is still
113. Id. ¶ 38.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. ¶ 47.
117. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Gov't Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Re-




120. Id. 9 181-83.
121. Id. T 392.
122. Id. ¶ 395.
123. Id.
124. Id. ¶¶ 464-65.
125. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Gov't Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, available
at http://www.italaw.com/cases/1606.
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pending.1 2 6
F. TRANSCANADA CORPORATION AND TRANSCANADA PIPELINES
LTD. v. THE UNITED STATES
TransCanada is a Canadian oil company.1 2 7 In 2008, TransCanada re-
quested the U.S. government's permission to build the Keystone XL
(Keystone) pipeline to transport bitumen, a mixture of hydrocarbons
from Alberta to Louisiana. 128 The southern section of the pipeline con-
necting Cushing, Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast is already operating.1.2 9
But, the northern section of the pipeline crossing the border between Ca-
nada and the United States required permission from the President of the
United States1 3 0
Keystone became a contentious political issue in the United States.131
Environmentalists pointed to the carbon-intensity of extracting oil from
the Alberta tar sands, and concluded that the pipeline would run counter
to the United State's efforts to reduce fossil fuel reliance.1 32
Seven years later, TransCanada applied for the permission, and in No-
vember 2015, President Obama rejected the project. 133 In January 2016,
TransCanada brought an ISDS claim against the United States for "un-
reasonably delaying approval" of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. 134
TransCanada demanded damages of over $15 billion.135 TransCanada al-
leges that the United States breached articles 1102, 1103, and 1105.136
In 2017, upon his election, President Trump pledged to permit the con-
struction of the pipeline and signed a presidential memorandum to that
effect.1 37 On March 24, 2017, President Trump officially approved the
126. Id.
127. TransCanada Corp. & TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. v. U.S, ICSID Case No. ARB/
16/21, available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/3823#sthash.B92P2UT3.dpuf.
128. TransCanada Corp. & TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. v. U.S, ICSID Case No. ARB/
16/21, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA (Jan. 6, 2016), ¶ 13, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ITA%20LAW%207030.pdf [hereinafter TransCanada Corp., No-
tice of Intent].
129. Id. T 19.
130. Id. ¶ 9.
131. Id. 1 9.
132. Id. ¶ 39.
133. See Rafi Letzter, The Keystone XL Pipeline, Which Trump Just Advanced, Will
Carry the Dirtiest Fossil Fuel on the Planet, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2017), http://
www.businessinsider.com/keystone-xl-pipeline-tar-sand-dirtiest-fossil-fuel-danger-
2017-1.
134. See TransCanada Corp., Notice of Intent, ¶ 43.
135. See TransCanada Corp., Notice of Intent.
136. Id. ¶ 8.
137. See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of the Dakota Access
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project.1 38 Within minutes, TransCanada dropped the suit against the
United States.139
III. CONCLUSION
The ISDS mechanism should be reformed to lessen public concerns of
its vulnerability to manipulation by investors. While many investors did
not succeed in their claims, Chapter 11 remains a powerful tool for pri-
vate parties to create political influence and inflict financial burdens on
NAFTA countries' environmental laws and regulations.
Further, there should be a detailed guideline on how to interpret arti-
cles 1105 and 1110. Past tribunal awards on these articles have shown
how unpredictable and inconsistent tribunal awards can be, especially
when ISDS tribunal awards are not binding. Thus, drafters for future
trade deals should include detailed guidance on the interpretations of ar-
ticles 1105 and 1110 for future ISDS tribunals to follow.
138. See President Trump Approves Construction of Keystone XL Pipeline, REUTERS
(Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/24/transcanada-gets-presidential-per
mit-to-construct-the-keystone-xi-pipeline.html.
139. See TransCanada Keystone XL rejection lawsuit dropped - arbitrator, REUTERS
(Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-pipeline-keystone-lawsuit-id
USL2N1GZ10I; see also TransCanada Corp. & TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. v.
U.S, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/3823#st
hash.B92P2UT3.dpuf.
